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  How	   far	   can	   the	   state	   formation	   paths	   of	   North	   African	   (NA)	   states	   help	   us	  understand	   the	   variable	   impact	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprising	   on	   them?	   Historical	  sociology’s	   concept	  of	   ‘path	  dependency’	  1	  shows	   that	  history	  matters:	   the	  past	  tangents	  of	  states’	   formation	  close	  off	  some	  possibilities	  and	  make	  others	  more	  likely.	   While	   the	   Uprising	   was	   spectacularly	   the	   product	   of	   agency-­‐-­‐reaction	  against	   the	   previous	   features	   of	   the	   regional	   states,	   structure-­‐-­‐the	   durable	  inheritances	  from	  the	  past	  have	  constrained	  the	  outcomes	  of	  agency.	  As	  Marx	  put	  it,	  men	  make	  their	  own	  history	  but	  not	  in	  circumstances	  of	  their	  own	  choosing.	  	  	  	   This	   article	   examines	   the	   literature	   on	   state	   formation	   in	   Morocco,	  Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   for	   evidence	   of	   how	   far	   it	   explains	   different	   mixes	   of	  continuity	  and	  change	  under	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprising,	  notably	  differences	  regarding	   the	   displacement	   or	   survival	   of	   the	   incumbent	   regime	   and	   also	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   the	   old	   authoritarian	   politics	   has	   been	   superseded	   by	  democratisation	  or	  has	  persisted	   in	  new	  forms.	  The	  aim	  is	   to	  provide	  a	  macro-­‐historical	   context	   for	   the	  more	   contemporary	  micro	   studies	   that	   follow	   in	   this	  special	  issue.2	  	   The	  article	  assesses	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  three	  regimes’	  distinctive	  packages	  of	  authority	   (seen	   through	   Weberian	   lenses),	   institution-­‐society	   relations	   (via	  Modernisation	   Theory)	   and	   political	   economy	   infrastructures	   (via	   Marxism).	  These	  approaches	  have	  dominated	   the	   state	   formation	   literature	  on	   the	   region	  and	  although	  each	  focuses	  on	  a	  particular–but	  indispensable–part	  of	  the	  picture,	  they	   can	   be	   subsumed	   loosely	  within	   historical	   sociology’s	   very	   broad	   church.	  Indeed,	  following	  the	  Marxist	  tradition,	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  conceptually	  distinct	  interacting	   layers	   of	   a	   pyramidal	   structure,	   with	   the	   economic	   ‘infrastructure’	  the	   base,	   elites	   (and	   social	   movements)	   the	   apex	   and	   institution-­‐society	  relations,	   the	   intermediate	   layer.	   Elites	   and	   social	   movements	   provide	   agency	  while	   institutions	   and	   economic	   infrastructure	   constitute	   the	   structure,	   with	  each	  interacting	  to	  explain	  outcomes.	  	  	  
The	  colonial	  heritage	   	  	  The	  starting	  point	  of	  state	   formation	   in	  North	  Africa	  (NA)	  goes	  back	  at	   least	   to	  the	   colonial	   period.	   Because	   the	   imperial	   powers	   merely	   took	   over	   and	   ruled	  through	   functioning	  pre-­‐modern	  regimes,	  NA	  states	  started	   independence	  with	  more	   secure	   identities	   than	   the	   many	   regional	   states	   newly	   created	   by	  imperialism.	  Second,	  colonial	  rule,	  in	  introducing	  secular	  education,	  precipitated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mahoney,	  James	  (2000)	  ‘Path	  Dependence	  in	  Historical	  Sociology,’	  Theory	  and	  Society,	  29:4,	  pp.	  507-­‐48	  2	  For	  an	  insightful	  historical	  overview	  of	  the	  region,	  see	  Michael	  J	  Willis,	  Politics	  and	  Power	  in	  the	  
Maghreb:	  Algeria,	  Tunisia	  and	  Morocco	  from	  Independence	  to	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  Hurst	  and	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2012.	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secular	   nationalist	   movements	   that,	   to	   an	   extent,	   marginalised	   Islam,	   thereby	  introducing	   enduring	   societal	   cleavages	   over	   the	   role	   of	   religion	   in	   public	   life.	  Thirdly,	  differences	  in	  regime	  type	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  monarchs	  with	  the	  colonial	  power:	  where	  they	  were	  seen	  to	  collaborate	  with	  imperialism,	  they	  were	  pushed	  aside	   in	   the	   transition	   to	   independence,	  with	   the	  nationalist	  movement	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  the	  army	  in	  Egypt	  constituting	  alternative	  pillars	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	   republics;	   by	   contrast	   the	   conflicts	   of	   Morocco’s	   King	   with	  the	  French	  endowed	   the	  monarchy	  with	  a	  nationalist	   legitimacy	   that	  kept	   it	   as	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  post-­‐independence	  state.	  	  	   As	   will	   be	   seen	   below,	   the	   first	   phase	   in	   post-­‐independence	   state	  formation	   (1945-­‐70)	   further	   accentuated	   the	   initial	   divergences	   between	   the	  regimes,	   particularly	   between	   ‘traditional’	   Morocco	   and	   the	   ‘modernising’	  republics.	  Thereafter,	  however,	   a	   convergence	  among	   them	  was	  driven	   first	  by	  similar	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  state	  consolidation	  strategies	  (1970-­‐1990)	  and	  later	  by	  similar	   neoliberal	   ‘authoritarian	   upgrading’	   (1990-­‐2010),	   which,	   in	   turn,	  generalized	   similar	   grievances	  manifested	   in	   the	  Arab	  Uprising.	   Yet,	   remaining	  regime	  differences	  appear	  to	  explain	  greater	  post-­‐Uprising	  continuity	  in	  Morocco	  and	  divergences	  in	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  democratisation	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia.	  	  	   	  	  
Independence	  and	  modernisation	  (1945-­‐70):	  Analyses	  of	  NA	  state	  formation	  in	  the	  first	  decades	  of	  independence	  was	  largely	  framed	  by	  modernisation	  theory,	  notably	  classics	  by	  Halpern	  and	  Huntington.	  A	  main	   theme	  was	   the	  mobilisation	   of	   new	  actors,	   notably	   the	  middle	   class,	   into	  politics	   and	   the	   rise	   of	  middle	   class-­‐led	  modernising	   regimes.3	  The	   building	   of	  new	  authority	  was	  seen	  as	  requiring	  that	  expanding	  participation	  be	  channelled	  through	   stable	   institutions;	   otherwise,	   ‘praetorian’	   struggles	   for	   power	   on	   the	  streets	  and	  via	  military	  coups	  and	  countercoups	  destabilised	  regimes.4	  Political	  effectiveness	   was	   measured	   by	   how	   far	   institutions	   performed	   vital	   political	  functions	   such	   as	   recruiting	   political	   elites,	   aggregating	   society	   interests	   and	  mobilising	   support.	  Regimes	  were	  distinguished,	   in	   terms	  of	  Weber’s	  authority	  types,5	  according	   to	   their	   relative	  concentration	  of	  power	   for	   radical	   change	  or	  its	  constraint	  by	  tradition	  or	  legal	  institutions.	  In	  the	  period	  after	  independence,	  regimes	   diverged	   sharply:	   the	   new	   republics	   concentrated	   power	   for	  modernising	  ‘revolutions’	  while	  monarchies	  put	  it	  in	  the	  service	  of	  ‘tradition.’	  At	  least	   as	   compared	   to	   the	  Mashreq,	   however,	   key	  NA	   states	   stood	   out	   for	   their	  seeming	  greater	  ability	  to	  advance	  modernisation	  and	  contain	  praetorianism.	  	   Republican	  Tunisia	  was	  the	  ‘poster	  child’	  of	  modernisation	  theorists.6	  The	  Tunisian	   state	   came	   to	   independence	   with	   important	   advantages.	   A	   small	  homogeneous	  society,	  Tunisia	  had	  a	  cohesive	  elite	  recruited	  from	  professionals	  sharing	   similar	   upper	  middle	   class,	   regional	   and	   educational	   backgrounds	   and	  the	   experience	   of	   the	   independence	   struggle.	   The	   regime,	   headed	   by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Manfred	  Halpern,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Social	  Change	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	   (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1963).	  4	  Samuel	   Huntington,	   Political	   Order	   in	   Changing	   Societies	   (New	   Haven:	   Yale	   University	   Press,	  1968).	  5	  Max	  Weber,	  Theory	  of	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Organization	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1964),	  pp.	  324-­‐406.	  6	  Clement	  Henry	  Moore,	  Politics	  in	  North	  Africa:	  Algeria,	  Morocco,	  Tunisia	   (Boston:	  Little	  Brown,	  1970).	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charismatic	   founder	   of	   the	   nation,	   Habib	   Bourguiba,	   enjoyed	   the	   ideological	  hegemony	   of	   a	   successful	   independence	   struggle	   and	   rested	   on	   a	   mass	   party	  incorporating	   middle	   class	   activists,	   the	   Islamic	   bourgeoisie,	   and	   a	   highly	  developed	  trade	  union	  movement.	  The	  regime	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  NA	   at	   development,	   notably	   via	   investment	   in	   education	   and	  modernisation	   of	  agriculture	   thru	  cooperatives.	   Its	   ‘soft’	  version	  of	  populist	  authoritarianism	  put	  concentrated	  power	  in	  the	  service	  of	  rational	  development,	  albeit	  at	  some	  cost	  in	  institutionalisation.	  	  	   Morocco’s	   monarchy	   also	   came	   to	   independence	   with	   an	   important	  advantage:	   by	   contrast	   to	   the	   Western-­‐created	   monarchies	   of	   the	   Levant	   and	  Gulf,	  Morocco’s	  had	  deep	  historical	  roots,	  uncontested	  traditional	  legitimacy	  and	  the	   added	   legitimacy	   of	   its	   king’s	   alignment	   with	   the	   nationalist	   movement	  against	   the	  French	  colonizer.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  Morocco,	   resembled	  those	  Arab	  countries,	  such	  as	  Egypt,	  where	  monarchies	  fell	  in	  the	  revolutions	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  in	  the	  large	  size	  of	  its	  cities,	  much	  lesser	  role	  of	  tribalism,	  large	   impoverished	   population	   and	   lack	   of	   oil	   wealth,	   combined	   with	   a	   fairly	  developed	  political	  society.	  It	  had	  a	  strong	  nationalist	  independence	  movement,	  the	   Istiqlal	   party,	   based	   on	   the	   urban	   commercial	   bourgeoisie	   and	   a	   mass	  incorporating	  opposition	  party	  of	  the	  left	  linked	  to	  the	  unions	  (the	  UNFP	  and	  its	  successors).	  This	  complexity	  of	  political	  society	  required	  the	  king	  be	  an	  effective	  politician	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  	  	  	   The	   consensus	   verdict	   among	  modernisation	   theorists	   at	   the	   end	  of	   the	  first	   decade	   of	   independence	   depicted	   Morocco	   as	   an	   ‘immobile	   monarchy,’7	  eschewing	   modernisation	   and	   preserving	   tradition.	   The	   ‘Commander	   of	   the	  Faithful’	   enjoyed	   enormous	   powers	   of	   patronage,	   including	   the	   constitutional	  power	   to	  dissolve	  parliament	  and	  appoint	   its	  upper	  house,	   thus	  weakening	   the	  elected	   parliament.	   He	   was	   seen	   to	   rule	   by	   exploiting	   Morocco’s	   divisions,	  balancing	   between	   Berber,	   rural	   notable	   and	   city	   Arabs.	   He	   used	   the	   pro-­‐monarchic	   notable	   parties,	   which	   delivered	   the	   conservative	   rural	   votes	   of	  clientalised	  peasants	  and	  pastoralists,	   to	  contain	  the	  politically	  mobilised	  cities.	  The	  Berber	   tribal	   recruited	   army	   and	   interior	  ministry	  were	   turned	   into	   royal	  fiefdoms	   and	   used	   to	   repress	   the	   urban	   nationalist-­‐left.	   Governments	   were	  picked	   from	   a	   rotating	   menu	   of	   king’s	   men	   and	   the	   bourgeois	   opposition	  politicians	   recruited	   via	   family	   connections	   from	   a	   small	   upper	   strata	   of	  landlords	  and	  rich	  merchants	  satisfied	  with	  the	  status	  quo.	  Decision-­‐making	  was	  paralysed,	   with	   landed	   interests	   obstructing	   land	   reform	   and	   education	  preserved	   as	   an	   elitist	   bastion.	   While	   the	   monarchy	   was	   congruent	   with	   still	  dominant	   traditional	   structures,	   it	   was	   being	   de-­‐legitimised	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	  emerging	  modern	  middle	  class.	  	   Egypt	   was	   a	   coherent	   society	   similar	   to	   Tunisia	   and	   also	   with	   its	   own	  distinct	   historic	   identity,	   although	   suffering	   from	   the	   worst	   resource	   to	  population	   deficit	   in	   the	   region.	   By	   contrast	   to	   Morocco,	   the	   monarchy	   and	  landed	   oligarchy	  were	   quickly	   overthrown	   once	  British	   protection	   diminished.	  Weberian	   writings,	   such	   as	   Dekmejian’s	   Egypt	   under	   Nasser,8	  interpreted	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   first	   republican	   president	   as	   charismatic,	   resting	   on	   his	   anti-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Moore,	   Politics	   in	   North	   Africa,	   1970;	   John	   Waterbury,	   The	   Commander	   of	   the	   Faithful:	   the	  
Moroccan	  political	  elite;	  a	  study	  of	  segmented	  politics	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  and	  Nicolson,	  1970).	  8	  R.	  Hrair	  Dekmejian,	  Egypt	  under	  Nasir:	  A	  study	  in	  political	  dynamics	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1971).	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imperialist	   foreign	   policy	   victories.	   Attempts	  were	  made	   to	   institutionalise	   the	  leader’s	   legitimacy	   in	   institutions,	   the	   presidency,	   but	   also	   parliament	   and	   in	  various	  versions	  of	   the	  ruling	  single	  party	  that	  were	  meant	  to	   incorporate	  pro-­‐regime	   participation	   but	  which	  were	   seen	   as	  weak	   and	   chiefly	   instruments	   of	  control.	   Less	   sympathetic	   writers	   framed	   Free	   Officer	   rule	   as	   ‘praetorian.’9	  	  Political	   economy	   approaches,	   such	   as	   those	   of	   Abdul	   Malik	   and	   Ayubi,	   saw	  Egypt	   as	   a	   modernising	   bureaucratic	   state	   fostering	   import	   substitute	  industrialisation	  to	  deal	  with	  land	  to	  population	  constraints;	  nationalisations	  of	  banking	   and	   industry	   and	   agrarian	   reform	   were	   breaking	   the	   hold	   of	   the	   old	  oligarchy	   over	   the	   economy	   and	   giving	   the	   regime	   the	   means	   to	   co-­‐opt	   the	  masses.10	  Egypt’s	   revolution	   significantly	   levelled	   what	   had	   been	   an	   oligarchic	  social	   structure.	   Indeed,	   Egypt’s	  more	   thorough	   social	   reforms,	   especially	   land	  reform,	   which	   had	   no	   analogue	   in	   either	   Tunisia	   or	   Morocco,	   produced	  significantly	   lower	   long-­‐term	   inequality	   levels	   (a	   Gini	   index	   of	   33	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	  compared	  to	  40	  in	  the	  latter	  cases).	  Egypt	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  a	  successful	  model	  in	  much	  of	  the	  Arab	  world	  during	  the	  pan-­‐Arab	  era.	  	  	  
Regime	  Consolidation	  (1970-­‐90)	  	  If	  the	  1950-­‐60s	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  period	  of	  radical	  change	  and	  mobilisation,	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  were	  ones	  of	  regime	  consolidation	  and	  de-­‐mobilisation.	  In	  the	  republics,	   the	   main	   change,	   in	   Weberian	   terms,	   was	   the	   ‘routinisation’	   of	  charismatic	   legitimacy	   in	   some	   combination	  of	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   leadership	   and	  rational	   institutions,	   while	   in	   Morocco	   the	   monarchy’s	   persistent	   traditional	  legitimacy	  and	  political	  dexterity	  allowed	  it	  to	  survive	  a	  period	  of	  major	  crisis.11	  	  	   Two	   iconic	   collections	   edited	   by	   Zartman	   et.	   al.	   explained	   regime	  consolidation	   in	   terms	   of	   increased	   institutionalisation.12	  	   Power	   was	   seen	   as	  conferred	  by	  top	  office	  in	  the	  centralised	  Tunisian	  and	  Egyptian	  republics.	  Office	  made	   the	   man,	   elites	   typically	   originating	   in	   modest	   societal	   strata,	   rising	  through	  occupations	  such	  as	  the	  military	  and	  teaching,	  from	  which	  they	  were	  co-­‐opted	  into	  elite	  ranks.	  The	  technocracy,	  more	  interested	  in	  efficiency	  and	  growth	  than	  redistribution,	  had	  moved	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  decision-­‐making	  somewhat	  at	  the	  expense	   of	   the	   party	   politicians	   and	   military	   officers	   recruited	   from	   the	   first	  post-­‐independence	  generation.	  In	  parallel,	  the	  oil	  wealth	  available	  in	  the	  region	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  price	  boom	  provided	  patronage	  for	  clientelist	  strategies	  and	  neo-­‐patrimonial	   practices	   that	   made	   regimes	   more	   autonomous	   of	   society.	   In	  Marxist	  accounts,	   the	  first	  generation	  elite	  of	  modest	  origins	  used	  its	  command	  of	   the	   public	   sector	   to	   enrich	   itself,	   consolidating	   a	   new	   privileged	   and	   status	  quo-­‐oriented	   state	   bourgeoisie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   state.13	  	   If	   the	   holders	   of	  private	  wealth	  still	  only	  enjoyed	  uneven	  access	  to	  power,	  ordinarily	  people	  were	  being	  demobilised.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Amos	  Perlmutter,	  Egypt,	  the	  Praetorian	  State	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1974).	  10	  Anwar	   Abdul	   Malik,	   Egypt:	  Military	   Society	   (New	   York:	   Vantage	   Books,	   1968);	   Nazih	   Ayubi,	  
Bureaucracy	  and	  Politics	  in	  Contemporary	  Egypt	  (London:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1980).	  	  11	  Jean	  Leca	  and	  Yves	  Schemeil,	  ‘Clientelisme	  et	  patrimonialisme	  dans	  le	  monde	  arabe,’	  Revue	  
internationale	  de	  science	  politique,	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  4,	  (1983),	  pp.	  455-­‐494	  12	  I.	  William	  Zartman,	  et.al.	  ,	  Political	  Elites	  in	  Arab	  North	  Africa	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  Longman	  1982).	  Adeed	   Dawisha	   and	   I.	   William	   Zartman,	   Beyond	   Coercion:	   the	   Durability	   of	   the	   Arab	   State	  (London:	  Croom-­‐Helm,	  1988),	  pp.	  61-­‐87.	  	  13	  Mahmoud	  Hussein,	  Class	  Conflict	  in	  Egypt	  (New	  York:	  Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  1973).	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   Variations	  in	  regimes	  were,	  however,	  significant	  and	  Morocco’s	  monarchy	  remained	  different.	  Property,	  traditional	  status	  and	  clientele	  connections	  to	  the	  monarchy	  were	  more	  important	  than	  formal	  office	  or	  technocratic	  skills	  in	  part	  because	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  more	  developed	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  land	  reform	  kept	  the	  rural	  notability	  fully	  intact.	  Morocco	  still	  stood	  out	  in	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  traditional	  elite	  and	   lack	  of	  elite	  recruitment	   from	  the	   lower	  middle	  strata	   that	  was	   typical	   in	   the	   republics;	   for	   its	   lack	   of	   mass	   incorporation;	   by	   the	  government’s	   disinterest	   in	   development	   programs;	   and	   by	   the	   absence	   of	  ideology	   in	   public	   life.	   Morocco	   had	   never	   had	   a	   populist	   social	   contract:	  however,	   rent	   transferred	   from	   the	   Gulf	   monarchies	   allowed	   increased	   public	  spending	  and	  a	  burst	  of	  growth	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Growth	  of	  educated	  youth	  with	  identities	   shaped	   by	   education	   in	   Arabic	   rather	   than	   French	   generated	   petit	  bourgeois	  radicalism	  formerly	  seen	  in	  the	  republics.	  Marked	  increases	   in	  social	  inequality	   and	   mass	   impoverishment	   and	   slowing	   economic	   growth	   as	   rent	  declined	  in	  the	  1980s,	  combined	  with	  increased	  social	  mobilisation,	  were	  seen	  to	  threaten	  the	  regime.14	  	   Mounting	  unrest	  in	  the	  late	  sixties	  was	  met	  by	  repression	  and	  a	  shutdown	  of	   parliamentary	   life;	   this,	   however,	   left	   a	   vacuum,	   issuing	   in	   two	   attempted	  military	   coups	   in	   the	   early	   1970s	   which	   pushed	   the	   king	   to	   re-­‐liberalise	   the	  political	   system	   in	   1975.	   This	   decision	   was	   made	   easier	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  monarchy	   had	   recovered	   its	   legitimacy	   through	   the	   annexation	   of	   Western	  Sahara,	  which	  won	  the	  acclaim	  of	  urban	  nationalist	  opinion	  and	  where	  also	  the	  military	   could	   be	   employed	   away	   from	   politics.	   The	   return	   to	   political	  liberalisation	   strengthened	   the	   regime:	   Zartman	   highlighted	   the	   advantage	   the	  Moroccan	   monarchy	   enjoyed	   from	   allowing	   opposition	   parties	   and	   semi-­‐competitive	   elections,	   with	   the	   king	   periodically	   forming	   a	   government	   that	  could	   include	  ministers	   from	  the	   loyal	  opposition;	  even	   though	  ultimate	  power	  remained	  with	   the	  palace,	   competition	   for	  office	  was	  a	  means	  of	   co-­‐opting	  and	  setting	  ambitious	  elites	  against	  each	  other.	  In	  retrospect,	  the	  monarchy’s	  mix	  of	  quite	   selective	   coercion,	   the	   safety	   valve	   of	   greater	   political	   freedoms,	   and	  ‘opposition	   as	   a	   form	   of	   support,’ 15 	  gave	   it	   a	   greater	   resiliency	   than	   the	  authoritarian	  republics.	  	  	   In	  Tunisia,	  the	  president	  for	  life	  retained	  unmatched	  legitimacy	  within	  the	  elite	   and	   brokered	   intra-­‐elite	   rivalries	   and	   circulation.	   Though	   tolerant	   of	  opposition	   (with	   dissidents	   out	   of	   favour	   later	   forgiven	   and	   readmitted	   to	   the	  elite),	   Bourguiba	   nevertheless	   purged	   any	   potential	   competitors	   within	   the	  ruling	  party	  and	  when	  the	  party	  became	  too	  autonomous	  used	  the	  government	  to	  weaken	  it,	  moving	  the	  system	  toward	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  order.	  Circulation	  at	  the	   top	  was	   blocked	  by	   the	   elderly	   leadership,	  with	   ‘change	  held	   in	   abeyance.’	  The	   party	   had	   lost	   mobilisational	   capacity	   while	   the	   trade	   union	   movement,	  formerly	  a	  regime	  partner,	  now	  led	  a	  general	  strike	  against	  it.	  	  Small	  opposition	  parties	   were	   secular	   liberal	   or	   leftist,	   many	   of	   them	   splinters	   from	   the	   ruling	  party,	  with	  Islamists	  still	  on	  the	  margins	  and	  directing	  their	  fire	  at	  secularists.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Mark	  Tessler,	   ‘Morocco:	   Institutional	  Pluralism	  and	  Monarchical	  Dominance,’	   in	  Dawisha	  and	  Zartman	  (eds.),	  Political	  Elites,	  1982,	  pp.	  35-­‐91.	  15	  I.	   William	   Zartman,	   ‘Opposition	   as	   a	   Support	   of	   the	   State,’	   in	   Dawisha	   and	   Zartman	   (eds.),	  
Beyond	  Coercion,	  pp.	  61-­‐87.	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Neo-­‐liberal	  Globalisation	  and	  Authoritarian	  Upgrading	  (1990-­‐2011)	  	   In	   this	   period	   neoliberal	   globalisation17	  came	   to	   NA	   as	   the	   old	   populist	  social	  contract	  and	  state	  developmental	  formulas	  gave	  way	  to	  ‘post-­‐populism.’18	  Several	   converging	   factors	   drove	   this	   change.	   All	   NA	   regimes	   suffered	   foreign	  exchange	   crises	   and	   debt	   attendant	   on	   the	   late	   1980s-­‐1990s	   depression	   in	   oil	  prices,	  and	  became	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  IMF	  and	  creditor	  pressures	  for	  austerity-­‐driven	   ‘structural	   adjustment.’	   Neoliberalism	   was	   promoted	   by	   cabinets	   of	  technocrats	   or	  businessmen	  more	   attuned	   to	   the	  demands	  of	   IFI	   than	   those	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 	  John	   Waterbury,	   The	   Egypt	   of	   Nasser	   and	   Sadat:	   the	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Two	   Regimes	  (Princeton	   University	   Press,	   1983);	   Raymond	   Hinnebusch,	   Egyptian	   Politics	   Under	   Sadat:	   The	  
Post-­‐Populist	  Transformation	  of	  an	  Authoritarian-­‐Modernizing	  State	   (Cambridge	   and	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  17	  Laura	   Guazzone	   and	   Daniela	   Pioppi,	   The	   Arab	   State	   and	  Neo-­‐Liberal	   Globalization	   (Reading:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  2009).	  18	  Raymond	  Hinnebusch,	  ‘Liberalization	  without	  Democratization	  in	  ‘Post-­‐populist’	  Authoritarian	  States:	  Evidence	  from	  	   Syria	  and	  Egypt,’	  in	  Nils	  Butenschon,	  Uri	  Davis	  and	  Manuel	  Hassassian,	  
Citizenship	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  (Syracuse	  NY:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  2000).	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their	  peoples.	  A	  parallel	  economic	  opening	  (infitah)	   led	  to	  unequal	  competition	  from	   Western	   exporters,	   driving	   national	   industries	   under,	   while	   tax	   breaks	  were	  accorded	  to	   foreign	  companies.	  Labour	  rights	  were	  removed,	  and	  welfare	  provision	  was	  delegated	  to	  private	  networks	  linked	  to	  the	  regime	  or	  to	  Islamists.	  Iconic	  of	  the	  shift	  in	  regimes’	  social	  bases	  was	  the	  partial	  reversal	  of	  land	  reform	  in	   Tunisia	   and	  Egypt	   that	   allowed	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   rural	   oligarchy	   at	   the	  expense	   of	   the	   peasantry	   initially	   favoured	   by	   populist	   regimes.	   As	   regimes	  abandoned	  efforts	   to	  politically	   incorporate	   their	  populations,	   they	   faced	  rising	  Islamist	   and	   anti-­‐Western	   opposition. 19 	  As	   such,	   authoritarian	   power	   was	  retained	  albeit	  now	  to	  protect	  new	  inequalities	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  against	  the	  mass	  public.	  	   Analysts	   asked	   how	   regimes	   could	   initiate	   economic	   liberalisation	   that	  potentially	  weakened	  state	  control	  over	  the	  economy	  and	  also	  antagonised	  their	  original	   popular	   constituencies	  while	   remaining	   in	   control	   and	   even	  politically	  liberalising.	  King20	  argued	  that	  the	  authoritarian	  survival	  formula	  amounted	  to	  a	  cultivation	   of	   new	   constituencies	   to	   substitute	   for	   those	   being	   abandoned:	   the	  privatisation	   of	   public	   sectors	   provided	   patronage	   to	   co-­‐opt	   rent-­‐seeking	  supportive	  crony	  bourgeoisies.	  Heydeman21	  argued	  that	  economic	  liberalisation	  replaced	  public	  with	  private	  monopolies;	  rather	  than	  generating	  an	  independent	  bourgeoisie	   able	   to	   check	   the	   state,	   privatisation	   created	   a	   rent-­‐seeking	   state-­‐dependent	  bourgeoisie	  that	  supported	  authoritarianism.	  By	  comparison	  to	  such	  concentrated	   entrenched	   interests	   supportive	   of	   regimes,	   the	   collective	   action	  problem	   deterred	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   lower	   strata	   to	   contest	   the	   upward	  redistribution	   of	   wealth	   that	   neo-­‐liberal	   policies	   promoted.	   Finally,	   regimes	  became	  dependent	  on	  Western	  powers	  to	  provide	  financial	  or	  security	  support	  	  used	   to	   co-­‐opt	   or	   control	   opposition,	   all	   legitimised	   after	   2011	   by	   the	   ‘war	   on	  terror’—which	   however,	   tended	   to	   further	   radicalise	   some	   opposition	  elements.22	  	  	   In	  parallel,	  regimes	  found	  ways	  to	  ‘upgrade’	  and	  adapt	  authoritarian	  rule	  in	  an	  age	  of	  democratisation.	  ‘Lop-­‐sided’	  limited	  political	  liberalisation	  favoured	  those	   who	   supported	   neoliberal	   policies. 23 	  Pluralisation	   of	   party	   systems	  permitted	   the	   emergence	   of	   competing	   opposition	   parties,	   facilitating	   the	   co-­‐optation	   and	   division	   of	   the	   opposition,	  while	   various	   electoral	   manipulations	  and	   bureaucratic	   restrictions	   prevented	   them	   from	   mobilising	   mass	  constituencies. 24 	  Gerrymandering	   of	   electoral	   systems	   fostered	   neoliberal	  parties	   incorporating	   the	   regimes’	   new	   crony	   capitalist	   constituencies.25	  The	  republics’	   original	   corporatist	   ruling	   parties	   situated	   themselves	   between	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Remy	  Leveau,	  Le	  Sabre	  et	  le	  Turban:	  L'Avenir	  du	  Maghreb	  (Paris:	  Francois	  Bourin,	  1993). 20	  Stephen	  King,	  The	  New	  Authoritarianism	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  21	  Steven	   Heydemann,	  Networks	   of	   Privilege	   in	   the	  Middle	  East:	   the	  Politics	   of	   Economic	  Reform	  
Revisited	  	  (New	  York	  and	  London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2004).	  22	  Lisa	  Storm,	  ‘The	  persistence	  of	  authoritarianism	  as	  a	  source	  of	  radicalization	  in	  North	  Africa,’	  
International	  Affairs,	  85:5,	  2009,	  997-­‐1013.	  23	  Raymond	  Hinnebusch,	  ‘Liberalization	  without	  Democratization.’	  	  24	  Jean	  Leca,	  ‘Opposition	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  ‘	  Government	  and	  Opposition,	  32:	  1997,	  557–577;	  Ellen	  Lust-­‐Okar,	  Structuring	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Arab	  World,	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005,	  126-­‐152	  25	  Bradley	   Louis	   Glasser,	   Economic	   Development	   and	   Political	   Reform:	   The	   Impact	   of	   	   External	  
Capital	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Cheltenham,	  UK:	  Edward	  Elgar,	  2001).	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conservative	   and	   radical	   opposition	   parties,	   but	   they	   and	   their	   corporatist	  organisations,	   such	   as	   workers’	   unions,	   that	   had	   mobilised	   the	   masses	   in	   the	  populist	   era	   (against	   the	   colonizer	   or	   old	   oligarchy)	   now	   functioned	   to	   keep	  them	   demobilised.26	  Able	   to	   stand	   above	   and	   balance	   between	   winners	   and	  losers,	   presidents	   and	   kings	   become	   more	   autonomous	   of	   their	   former	  party/bureaucratic/popular	   bases,	   while	   ruling	   families,	   going	   into	   business,	  were	   aggrandized;	   yet,	   reneging	   on	   the	   former	   social	   contract,	   they	   suffered	  legitimacy	  losses	  and	  had	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  divide	  and	  rule	  and	  on	  coercion.	  	  	  	   In	  Tunisia,	  neoliberalism	   followed	  an	   incremental	  path.	  The	   trade	  union	  federation	   initially	   effectively	   resisted	   moves	   against	   worker	   interests	   with	  protests	   and	   strikes,	   hence	   reforms	   had	   to	   be	   agreed	   via	   a	   tripartite	   state-­‐business-­‐union	   corporatism.	  However,	   this	   changed	  when	  debt	   led	   to	   negative	  growth	  and	  an	   IMF	  structural	  adjustment	  program	   in	   the	  1980s;	  union	   leaders	  were	  arrested	  and	  purged	  and	  loyalists	  appointed.	  Under	  Ben	  Ali,	  who	  brought	  in	  technocrats,	  neoliberalism	  deepened.	  The	  new	  union	  leadership	  agreed	  to	  Ben	  Ali’s	  economic	  policies,	  claiming	  workers	  had	  to	  adapt	  to	  economic	  globalisation	  and	  there	  were	  few	  strikes	  even	  though	  worker	  gains	  were	  eroded.	  	  	  	   Political	   developments	   were	   shaped	   by	   this	   political	   economy	   context.	  The	   Ben	   Ali	   era	   started	   with	   political	   liberalization,	   under	   a	   national	   pact	   in	  which	  the	  ruling	  party	  was	  to	  forfeit	  its	  privileged	  position;	  however	  the	  Islamist	  Al-­‐Nahda	   movement	   grew,	   posing	   as	   the	   new	   champion	   of	   those	   being	  marginalised.	   Unable	   to	   co-­‐opt	   the	   opposition,	   Ben	   Ali	   banned	   Al-­‐Nahda,	   and	  initiated	  controlled	  elections	  in	  which	  the	  ruling	  Democratic	  Constitutional	  Rally	  (RCD)	  always	  won	  big	  majorities.	  The	  contraction	  of	  political	  and	  press	  freedoms	  put	  Tunisia	  among	  the	  more	  authoritarian	  of	  the	  Arab	  states	  despite	  its	  relatively	  high	  socio-­‐economic	  indicators.27	  	   Privatisation	   took	   an	   increasingly	   crony	   capitalist	   form,	   with	   the	  president’s	   and	   his	   wife’s	   relatives	   the	   biggest	   business	   operators.	   Typically,	  state	  banks	  gave	  unsecured	  loans	  to	  insiders	  to	  buy	  up	  state	  assets,	  who	  laid	  off	  workers,	  sometimes	  sold	  the	  machinery,	  and	  neglected	  to	  repay	  the	   loans.	  Also	  an	   agrarian	   counter-­‐revolution	   transferred	   600,000	   ha.	   to	   a	   rural	   elite	   and	  privatised	   peasant	   cooperatives,	   all	   with	   support	   from	   a	   World	   Bank	   loan.	  Joining	  of	  the	  Euro-­‐Med	  partnership	  forced	  tariff	  cuts	  and	  bankruptcies	  on	  local	  manufacturers.	  By	  2007,	  the	  private	  sector	  dominated	  and	  the	  IMF	  gave	  Tunisia	  star	  marks.	  The	  growth	  rate	  was	  5%	  in	  1982-­‐86,	  and	  3.5%	  in	  1992-­‐96	  but,	  owing	  to	   unequal	   distribution,	   the	   standard	   of	   living	   of	   the	   masses	   still	   fell.	  Nonetheless,	   Tunisia	   retained	   more	   of	   a	   social	   safety	   net	   and	   investment	   in	  health	  and	  education	  than	  other	  NA	  states;	  and	  to	  keep	  social	  peace,	  firms	  had	  to	  make	  contributions	  to	  national	  insurance,	  which	  deterred	  investors	  who	  had	  to	  operate	   in	   a	   neoliberal	   global	   market	   wherein	   labour	   costs	   must	   be	   driven	  down.28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  King,	  The	  New	  Authoritarianism.	  27	  Emma	  Murphy,	  Economic	  and	  Political	  Change	  in	  Tunisia:	  From	  Bourguiba	  to	  Ben	  Ali	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  1999);	  RH	  Haugbolle	  and	  F	  Cavatorta,	  ‘Will	  the	  real	  Tunisian	  opposition	  please	  stand	  up?	  Opposition	  coordination	  failures	  under	  authoritarian	  constraints,’	  British	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies	  38	  (3),	  323-­‐341	  28	  Larbi	   Sadiki,	   ‘The	   clay	   ‘tiger’:	   Tunisia	   and	   the	   end	   of	   the	   ‘bread’	   economic	   model,’	   IPRIS	  
Maghreb	  Bulletin,	   summer,	  2011;	   Jean-­‐Pierre	  Cassarino,	   ‘Participatory	  development	  and	   liberal	  reforms	   in	   Tunisia:	   the	   gradual	   incorporation	   of	   some	   economic	   networks,’	   in	   Heydemann,	  
Networks	  of	  Privilege,	  pp.	  223-­‐242.	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   A	  similar	  economic	  tangent	  was	  evident	  in	  Morocco.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  country	  had	  suffered	  a	  sharp	  drop	  in	  export	  earnings	  from	  phosphates	  while	  oil	  import	   costs	   had	   risen.	   Soaring	   debt	   and	   later	   slashes	   in	   Saudi	   aid	   forced	  structural	   adjustment	   involving	   public	   spending	   and	   subsidy	   cuts	   that	   led	   to	  bread	  riots	  in	  1984.	  While	  the	  riots	  delayed	  austerity,	  by	  the	  1990s	  Morocco	  was	  a	  model	  of	  budgetary	  discipline.	  Privatisation	  of	   the	  public	  sector	  concentrated	  its	   assets	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   royal	   family	   and	   a	   handful	   of	   cronies	   or	   foreign	  firms.	   Public	   employment,	   wages	   and	   the	   HDI	   all	   fell	   while	   the	   percentage	   in	  poverty	   rose	   from	   13%	   in	   1990-­‐1	   to	   25%	   in	   2005. 29 	  Since,	   under	   these	  circumstances,	  urbanization	  was	   increasing	   the	  dangers	  of	  protest,	  private	  and	  foreign	  aid	  funds	  were	  channelled	  into	  charities	  under	  royal	  control.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   to	   organise	   a	   constituency	   among	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   neoliberalism,	   the	  regime	   created	   a	   new	   centre-­‐right	   party,	   the	   Constitutional	   Union,	  representative	   of	   the	   higher	   bourgeoisie	   and	   championing	   militant	  neoliberalism;	   the	   regime	   used	   gerrymandering,	   fraud	   and	   rural	   notables	   to	  deliver	  the	  votes	  to	  put	  it	  in	  power.	  	  With	  the	  regime	  weakening	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  as	  the	  king	  lost	  legitimacy	  for	  his	  stand	  with	  the	  West	   in	  the	  Gulf	  war	  and	  royal	  succession	   imminent,	   the	  
makhzen	  placated	   the	  opposition	  with	   increased	   freedom	  of	   the	  press	  and	  civil	  society,	   reductions	   in	  repression	  and	   fairer	  elections.	  This	  allowed	  the	  populist	  Union	   Socialiste	   des	   Forces	   Populaires	   (USFP,)	   which	   had	   opposed	   structural	  adjustment,	  to	  win	  an	  electoral	  plurality	  and	  form	  the	  government	  under	  Abdul	  Salam	  Yussufi,	   the	   first	   time	   the	  opposition	  had	   taken	  power	   after	   an	   election;	  yet	   this	   seeming	   watershed	   in	   democratic	   accountability	   was	   diluted	   by	   the	  royal-­‐appointed	  upper	  house	  and	  the	  king’s	  veto	  over	  policy	  from	  his	  power	  to	  dismiss	  the	  government.	  As	  its	  co-­‐optation	  by	  the	  regime	  cost	  the	  USFP	  popular	  support,	   the	   opposition’s	   rise	   to	   government	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	   variation	   on	  classic	  divide	  and	  rule.30	  	   In	  1999,	  the	  new	  King,	  Muhammad	  VI,	  came	  to	  power,	  promising	  political	  reform	  but	  by	  2003	  his	  opening	  was	  reversed	  as	   the	  civil	  war	   in	  Algeria,	  9/11,	  and	   terrorist	   incidents	   in	  Morocco	   legitimised	  a	   ‘war	  on	   terror’	   against	   Islamic	  militancy	   that	   extended	   to	   all	   dissent	   deemed	   threatening.	   Indeed,	   the	   very	  moderation	  of	  the	  mainstream	  Islamic	  movements,	   increasing	  their	  appeal,	  and	  their	   attempts	   to	   create	   a	   secular-­‐Islamist	   coalition	   to	   pressure	   the	  monarchy	  into	   democratisation,	   made	   them	   special	   targets	   of	   repression.31	  From	   2003-­‐2011,	  power	   flowed	  away	   from	  politicians	  and	  political	   institutions	   to	   a	  newly	  empowered	  monarchy	  and	  technocrats	  attuned	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  IFIs.	  	  	   Egypt’s	  post-­‐populist	  political	  development	  was	  also	  marked	  by	  cycles	  of	  opening,	  when	  the	  regime	  had	  sufficient	  rent	  to	  sustain	  patronage,	  and	  closing,	  when	   opposition	   mounted,	   often	   associated	   with	   deepening	   neoliberalism	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Myriam	   Catusse,	   ‘Morocco’s	   Political	   Economy:	   Ambiguous	   Privatization	   and	   the	   Emerging	  Social	  Question’	  in	  Guazzone	  and	  Pioppi,	  The	  Arab	  State	  and	  Neo-­‐Liberal	  Globalization,	  185-­‐216.	  30	  Remy	  Leveau.	  ‘The	  Moroccan	  Monarchy:	  A	  Political	  System	  in	  Quest	  of	  a	  New	  Equilibrium.’	  In	  
Middle	  East	  Monarchies:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Modernity,	  edited	  by	  Joseph	  Kostiner.	  Boulder:	  Lynne	  Rienner,	  2000;	  Michael	  Willis,	  ‘Morocco’s	  Islamists	  and	  the	  Legislative	  Elections	  of	  2002:	  The	  Strange	  Case	  of	  the	  Party	  that	  did	  not	  Want	  to	  Win’	  in	  Mediterranean	  Politics,	  9:	  1,	  Winter	  2004;	  Francesco	  Cavatorta,	  ‘Divided	  they	  stand,	  divided	  they	  fail’:	  opposition	  politics	  in	  Morocco,’	  
Democratization	  16	  (1),	  137-­‐156.	  31	  Francesco	  Cavatorta,	  ‘Civil	  society,	  Islamism	  and	  democratisation:	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco,’	  Journal	  
of	  Modern	  African	  Studies,	  44:2,	  2006	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unpopular	   foreign	  policy	  moves.32	  Egypt's	  regime	  had	  cracked	  down	  in	   the	   late	  Sadat	   period	   on	   mounting	   opposition,	   notably	   to	   peace	   with	   Israel,	   but	   re-­‐liberalised	   politically	   in	   the	   early	   Mubarak	   period	   when	   enough	   rent	   was	  accumulated	   to	   resist	   external	   neoliberal	   pressures.	   The	   ruling	   National	  Democratic	  Party	  (NDP)	  positioned	  itself	  between	  populism,	  represented	  by	  the	  left-­‐wing	  NPUP,	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism	  advocated	  by	  the	  Wafd,	  representative	  of	  the	  
infitah	  bourgeoisie	  with	  ties	  to	  Western	  capital.	  However,	  the	  oil	  price	  collapse	  of	  the	  late	  1980s,	  debt	  and	  IMF	  pressures	  put	  harder	  reforms,	  notably	  privatisation	  of	   the	  public	   sector,	  on	   the	  agenda.	  For	   its	  anti-­‐Saddam	  stand	   in	   the	  1990	  Gulf	  war,	  Western	  donors	  accorded	  Cairo	  a	  big	  windfall	  in	  debt	  relief	  in	  exchange	  for	  deepening	   of	   economic	   ‘reform.’	   Having	   previously	   referred	   to	   the	   IMF	   as	   a	  ‘quack	   doctor,’	   Mubarak	   now	   claimed	   that	   under	   globalisation	   there	   was	   no	  alternative	  to	  its	  demands.	  The	  regime	  fostered	  a	  supportive	  coalition:	  business	  organisations	   were	   well	   organised	   and	   got	   increasing	   political	   access	   thru	  parliament,	  while	  the	  NDP	  lurched	  to	  the	  right.	  The	  Wafd	  was	  co-­‐opted,	  allowed	  15%	   of	   the	   vote	   and	   58	   parliamentary	   seats,	   while	   the	   Ikhwan	   (Muslim	  Brotherhood),	  representative	  of	  Gulf	  capital,	  was	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  Wafd's	  lists.	  All	   shared	   support	   for	   neo-­‐liberalism,	   privatization	   of	   the	   public	   sector,	   and	  revision	  of	   land	  tenancy	   laws	  to	   favour	  owners.	  The	  parties	  of	   the	   left,	  Hizb	  al-­‐‘Amal	  and	  the	  NPUP,	  were	  prevented	  from	  forming	  a	  joint	  list	  and	  from	  actively	  campaigning	  among	  the	  mass	  public.	  However,	  in	  parallel	  with	  neoliberalisation,	  the	  regime	  faced	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  an	  increasingly	  violent	  Islamist	  Uprising;	  and,	   instead	   of	   strengthening	   the	   moderate	   Ikhwan	   in	   order	   to	   isolate	   the	  radicals,	   the	  regime	  turned	  against	  and	  repressed	   the	   Ikhwan,	   thus	  contracting	  the	  political	  opening.	  	   In	   the	   2000s,	   the	   NDP	   moved	   even	   further	   right	   as	   it	   increasingly	   co-­‐opted	   the	   emerging	   business	   class.	   Businessmen	   and	   Western	   educated	  neoliberal	   oriented	   technocrats	   encouraged	   by	   Gamal	   Mubarak	   took	   over	   the	  government	  under	  the	  2004	  ministry	  of	  Ahmad	  al-­‐Nazif.	  Under	   it,	  privatization	  involved	  selling	  public	  assets	  at	  below	  market	  prices	   to	  a	  small	  group	  of	  crony	  capitalist	  bureaucrats	  and	  investors.	  Lucrative	  franchises	  on	  foreign	  firms	  were	  also	  acquired	  by	  crony	  capitalists.	  In	  parallel,	  a	  new	  labour	  law,	  no.	  12	  of	  2003,	  increased	   the	  right	  of	  employers	   to	  dismiss	  workers	  and	  a	  new	  tax	   law	  shifted	  the	   burden	   from	   the	   rich	   to	   the	   middle	   class,	   with	   the	   rate	   levied	   on	   the	  superrich	   cut	   to	   10%.	   The	   1990s	   reversal	   of	   Nasser’s	   tenancy	   laws	   led	   to	  expulsions	   of	   peasants	   from	   the	   land,	   protests	   and	   repression	   by	   police	   and	  landlord	   thugs;	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1990s,	   7%	   of	   the	   population	   owned	   60%	   of	   the	  land.	   This	  was	   paralleled	   in	   foreign	   policy	   by	   growing	   ties,	   including	   business	  relations,	  with	  Israel.	  	   How	   were	   the	   masses	   controlled	   and	   opposition	   marginalised?	   World	  Bank	  and	  other	   funders	  provided	   funds	   to	  pay	  off	   those	  dismissed	   from	  public	  employment	   in	   the	   transition	   period.	   Much	   of	   the	   politically	   conscious	   urban	  population	  did	  not	  vote	  while	  the	  ruling	  party	  distributed	  patronage	  in	  elections,	  rural	  notables	  delivered	  their	  clients	  and	  businessmen	  trucked	  their	  workers	  to	  the	   polls.	   The	   labour	   union	   leadership	   was	   co-­‐opted,	   endorsing	   the	   1991	  privatisation	   law	   and	   containing	   pressures	   for	   strikes	   while	   the	   government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Glasser,	  Economic	  Development	  and	  Political	  Reform,	  pp.	  50-­‐54.	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repressed	  independent	  unions;	  yet,	   from	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  Egypt	  experienced	  the	  longest	  wave	  of	  worker	  protests	  and	  strikes	  since	  WW	  II.	  	  On	  and	  off	  repression	  continued	  as	  emergency	  law	  was	  replaced	  by	  counter-­‐terrorism	  law.	  	   The	  neoliberal	  NDP	  government	  and	  perceived	  plans	  for	  Mubarak	  to	  pass	  power	   to	   his	   son,	   neoliberal	   icon,	   Gamal	   Mubarak,	   provoked	   the	   kefaya	  demonstrations	   calling	   for	   Mubarak	   to	   go;	   this,	   combined	   with	   US	   democracy	  pressures,	  led	  to	  the	  relatively	  free	  2005	  parliamentary	  election	  in	  which	  the	  MB	  emerged	  as	  the	  main	  opposition,	  with	  88	  seats	  and	  20%	  of	  the	  vote;	  as,	  however,	  US	   pressures	   receded,	   political	   liberalisation	   was	   again	   reversed,	   with	   the	  Brotherhood	   facing	   new	   repression.	   One	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   helped	   spark	   the	  Uprising	   against	  Mubarak	  was	   the	   2010	   election,	  when	   the	   regime	   engineered	  the	  virtual	  expulsion	  of	  the	  opposition	  from	  parliament.	  	  	   The	   regime’s	   zig-­‐zag,	   combining	   selective	   relaxation	   of	   control	   over	   the	  political	   arena—e.g.	   greater	   freedom	   of	   the	   press	   and	   opposition	   access	   to	  parliament—with	  subsequent	  re-­‐tightening	  and	  closing	  of	  access,	  turned	  limited	  political	   pluralisation	   into	   a	   source	   of	   frustration	   rather	   than	   a	   safely	   value	   as	  intended.	  	  	   	  	  
	  
The	  Arab	  Uprising	  (2010-­‐-­‐)	  The	   underlying	   causes	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprising,	   a	   combination	   of	   neoliberal	  economics	   and	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   regimes,	   were	   relatively	   uniformly	   present	  across	  North	  Africa.	  The	  Uprising	  also	  took	  the	  quite	  similar-­‐and	  unprecedented-­‐form	  of	  large	  scale	  peaceful	  mass	  protest	  against	  incumbent	  regimes,	  indicative	  of	   similar	   high	   levels	   of	   social	   mobilisation	   (e.g.	   education,	   middle	   class	  formation)	   across	   the	   region. 33 	  Notwithstanding	   this,	   NA	   regimes	   sharply	  diverged,	   with	   Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   experiencing	   leadership	   change	   and	   state	  weakening	   while	   Morocco	   seemingly	   escaped	   this.34	  Do	   their	   state	   formation	  tangents	  help	  explain	  these	  variations	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  change?	  Do	  they	  equip	  NA	  states	   for	   a	   post-­‐Uprising	   transition	   to	   stable	   democracy	   or	   make	   for	   more	  authoritarian	  continuity	  than	  change?	  	  	  
Regime	  Change	  or	  Adaptation	  Why	   has	   Morocco’s	   monarchy	   proved	   more	   resilient,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  analysts	   long	   saw	   it	   as	  more,	   not	   less,	   vulnerable	   because	   of	   its	   disinterest	   in	  development	   and	   social	   reform?	   Moreover,	   the	   neoliberalism	   that	   helped	  provoke	  the	  Arab	  uprising	  had	  actually	  been	  more	  damaging	  in	  Morocco	  than	  in	  the	  republics:	   its	  starting	  point	  was	  a	  more	  unequal	  society	   that	  only	  got	  more	  unequal.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  pre-­‐neoliberal	  developmental	  heritage	  in	  the	  republics	  left	   behind	   better	   scores	   on	   indicators	   such	   as	   growth,	   equality,	   poverty	  reduction	  and	  education	  (Table	  1).	  Ironically,	  Tunisia,	  where	  the	  Uprising	  began,	  had	   the	   lowest	   poverty	   rate	   in	   the	   region,	   higher	   education,	   literacy	   rates,	   life	  expectancy,	   and	  per	   capita	   income	  compared	   to	  Egypt	   and	  Morocco,	   combined	  with	  respectable	  growth	  rates	  of	  5%	  per	  year.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  George	  Joffé,	  	  ‘The	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  North	  Africa:	  origins	  and	  prospects,’	  The	  Journal	  of	  North	  
African	  Studies,	  16:4,	  2011;	  Lisa	  Anderson,	  ‘Demystifying	  the	  Arab	  Spring:	  Parsing	  the	  Differences	  between	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  and	  Libya,’	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  2	  May-­‐June,	  2011.	  34	  Ricardo	  Laremont,	  ed.	  Revolution,	  Revolt	  and	  Reform	  in	  North	  Africa:	  The	  Arab	  Spring	  and	  
Beyond,	  London	  and	  NY:	  Routledge,	  2013	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INSERT	  TABLE	  1	  HERE	  (from	  pg	  35)	  	   The	  enduring	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  centuries-­‐old	  Moroccan	  dynasty	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  republican	  presidents	  was	  crucial.	  The	  republics’	   legitimacy	  relied	  on	  some	   combination	   of	   nationalism	   and	   development	   performance.	   But	   Egypt’s	  regime	  squandered	   the	  nationalist	   legitimacy	  of	  Nasser,	   its	   founding	  president,	  especially	   under	  Mubarak	  whose	   collaboration	  with	   Israel	   and	   dependence	   on	  the	   US,	   paralleled	   by	   the	   self-­‐enrichment	   of	   the	   presidential	   family,	   was	  particularly	   delegitimising.35	  The	   enrichment	   of	   the	   presidential	   family	   was	  similar	   in	  Tunisia.	  The	  aggrandizement	  of	   the	  Moroccan	  monarch	  and	  his	  close	  cronies	   was	   no	   less	   egregious,	   yet	   the	   king	   retained	   hegemony	   over	   society,	  especially	   the	   poor;	   owning	   big	   chunks	   of	   the	   economy	   he	   was,	   according	   to	  LeVine,36	  enabled	  to	  both	  profiteer	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  provide	  them	  with	   charity.	   Kings,	   responsible	   to	   God,	   are	   perhaps	   expected	   to	   aggrandize	  themselves	   while	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   republican	   presidents,	   responsible	   to	   the	  ‘People,’	  is	  debilitated	  by	  the	  same	  process.	  In	  addition,	  while	  presidents	  cannot	  easily	   avoid	   responsibility	   for	   policies,	   kings	   are	   better	   able	   to	   distance	  themselves,	   however	  much	   they	   have	   the	   last	  word,	   from	   the	   policies	   of	   their	  governments	   and	   to	   deflect	   public	   anger	   onto	   those	   incumbents,	   who	   can	   be	  rotated	   as	   a	   way	   of	   appeasing	   discontent.	   While	   Morocco’s	   system	   diffused	  responsibility	   away	   from	   the	   king,	   in	   Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   the	   concentration	   of	  power	  and	  patronage	  in	  the	  presidential	  families	  concentrated	  responsibility.	  	   A	  second	  factor	  was	  the	  deeper	  and	  more	  authentic	  political	  pluralisation	  in	  Morocco	  combined	  with	   a	   lower	   level	  of	   social	  mobilisation	  compared	   to	   the	  republics.	  Morocco’s	   limiting	   of	   education	   also	   limited	   employment	   absorption	  pressures	   while	   the	   preservation	   of	   patriarchal	   society	   contained	   political	  demands.	  By	  contrast,	  Tunisia	  combined,	  of	  the	  three	  states,	  the	  most	  educated	  and	   socially	   mobilised	   population,	   which,	   however,	   could	   not	   be	   sufficiently	  absorbed	  into	  jobs,	  with	  the	  least	  open	  political	  system,	  where	  the	  Islamists	  and	  secular	  opposition	  were	  thoroughly	  excluded	  from	  the	  political	  arena,	  the	  press	  least	  free,	  and	  NGOs	  most	  controlled.	  Egypt	  was	  more	  open	  than	  Tunisia	  and	  less	  than	  Morocco,	  with	  its	  limited	  pluralisation	  periodically	  reversed	  and	  nearly	  shut	  down	   just	   prior	   to	   the	   Uprising.	   Morocco’s	   system	   afforded	   more	   effective	  mechanisms	   for	   co-­‐optation	   of	   the	   political	   opposition,	   which	   was	   largely	  excluded	  in	  Tunisia	  or	  frustrated	  by	  the	  regime’s	  cat	  and	  mouse	  games	  in	  Egypt.	  	   Third,	   the	   republics	   were	   less	   advantageously	   positioned	   to	   manage	  Islamic-­‐secular	   cleavages	   than	   Morocco’s	   monarchy.	   Ironically,	   in	   the	   secular	  Egyptian	   and	   Tunisian	   regime	   political	   Islamists	   were	   both	   alienated	   and	  marginalised	   in	   the	   short	   run.	   Yet	   they	  were	   actually	   relatively	   empowered	   in	  the	  longer	  run:	  regimes’	  repression	  tended	  to	  disproportionately	  weaken	  secular	  forces	   whose	   associations	   and	   access	   to	   the	   public	   could	   be	   more	   easily	  contained	   compared	   to	   Islamists	   who	   enjoyed	   the	   advantage	   of	   mosques	   and	  religious	  networks	  relatively	  more	  immune	  to	  state	  control.	  The	  privatisation	  of	  state	   welfare	   functions	   inadvertently	   positioned	   Islamists	   to	   move	   into	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Mark	  Sedgwick,	  ‘Measuring	  Egyptian	  Regime	  Legitimacy,’	  Middle	  East	  Critique	  19:3,	  Fall	  2010,	  251-­‐67.	  36	  Mark	  LeVine,	  ‘In	  the	  Arab	  world’s	  deepest	  state	  the	  revolution	  continues,’	  al-­‐Jazeera,	  20	  February,	  2013	  http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/20132209305838184.html	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vacuum	  where	  the	  post-­‐populist	  republics	  withdrew	  from	  welfare	  provision.	  The	  republics,	   especially	   Tunisia,	   passed	   up	   the	   opportunity	   to	   effectively	   co-­‐opt	  moderate	   Islamists	   in	   order	   to	   marginalise	   the	   militants.	   Many	   secular	  opposition	   parties,	   such	   as	   the	   Egyptian	   NPUP,	   saw	   the	   Islamists	   as	   a	   greater	  threat	  than	  the	  regime,	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  co-­‐opted	  and	  neutered	  by	  the	  latter,	  thereby	  losing	  their	  popular	  bases;	  as	  such,	  the	  spearhead	  of	  opposition	  passed	  to	  younger	  generation	  of	  activists,	  among	  whom	  secularists	  and	  Islamists	  united	  in	  the	  protests	  that	  brought	  down	  Mubarak.	  	   In	  Morocco,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  King’s	  religious	  legitimacy	  made	  it	  harder	  for	  Islamists	  movements	   to	   challenge	   the	   regime	   and	   easier	   for	   him	   to	   split	   them	  and	  co-­‐opt	  the	  moderates	  among	  them:	  thus,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  diffuse	  pressure	  for	  regime	  change	  after	  2011,	  most	  notably	  by	  co-­‐opting	   the	  moderate	   Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  (PJD)	  Islamists,	  and	  allowing	  it	  to	  form	  a	  government	  after	  it	  gained	  a	  plurality	  in	  elections,	  while	  the	  rival	  anti-­‐monarchist	  Justice	  and	  Charity	  Islamists	  founded	  by	  Abdesslam	  Yassine	  remained	  in	  (peaceful)	  opposition	  and	  Salafist,	   a	   third	  grouping,	   remained	  opposed	   to	   the	   latter	   two.	  The	   regime	  also	  exploited	   the	   Islam-­‐secular	   divide	   to	   abort	   a	   democratic	   coalition	   against	   the	  monarchy.	  Ironically,	  secularists	  supported	  the	  religious	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  king	  as	  a	  bulwark	  against	  Islamists;	  in	  turn,	  many	  Islamists	  saw	  themselves	  closer	  to	  the	  king	   than	   to	   secularists.	   Some	   secularists	   wanted	   Islamists	   excluded	   from	  politics	   because,	   being	   cut	   off	   from	  mass	   culture,	   they	   could	  not	   compete	  with	  the	   Islamist’s	   ability	   to	   use	   mosques	   and	   charity	   to	   reach	   the	   people.	   Many	  Westernised	  women	   felt	   threatened	   by	   the	   Islamists	   but	   the	   King,	   immune	   to	  Islamist	  criticism,	  promoted	  and	  protected	  their	  rights,	  giving	  them	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  regime.37	  Thus,	  the	  many	  cultural	  conflicts	  in	  Morocco’s	  political	  space	  continued	  to	  prevent	  the	  opposition	  coalition	  needed	  to	  pressure	  the	  palace	  into	  thorough	  democratisation.	  	  	   Finally,	  how	  regimes	  responded	  to	  the	  Uprising	  mattered,	  with	  repression	  proving	  quite	  counterproductive	  in	  the	  two	  republics	  and	  increasing	  the	  scope	  of	  anti-­‐regime	  mobilisation	  to	  the	  point	  where	  regime	  cohesion,	  hence	  its	  capacity	  to	   repress,	   broke	   down.38	  Decisive	   was	   the	   unwillingness	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   and	  Tunisian	  armies	  to	  repress	  the	  protests	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  president.	  In	  Egypt	  the	  highly	   developed	  mukhabarat	   had	   successfully	   contained	   protest	   for	   decades;	  yet	  resentment	  against	  police	  corruption	  and	  brutality	  and	  experience	  of	  street	  protest	  built	  up	  over	  many	  years,	  and,	  combined	  with	  internet	  organising,	  led	  to	  a	  watershed	  massive	  mobilisation	   that	  overwhelmed	   the	  police;	  once	   the	  army	  proved	  unwilling	   to	   step	   in	   and	   fire	   on	  massed	   civilians,	   the	   regime’s	   coercive	  capacity	   was	   spent.39	  In	   Tunisia	   also,	   the	   small	   army	   was	   unwilling	   to	   fire	   on	  protestors	   while	   the	   combined	   mobilisational	   role	   of	   the	   trade	   unions	   and	  middle	   class	   activists	   was	   accelerated	   by	   police	   brutality.	   Morocco	   also	  experienced	   demonstrations	   by	   the	   February	   20th	   movement	   that	   briefly	  combined	   Islamist	  and	  secular	  elements	  demanding	  a	  constitutional	  monarchy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 	  Julie	   E.	   Pruzan-­‐Jorgensen,	   ‘Analysing	   Authoritarian	   Regime	   Legitimation:	   Findings	   from	  Morocco,’	  Middle	  East	  Critique:	  19:3	  (2010),	  pp.	  269-­‐286.	  38	  Frederic	  Volpi,	  ‘Explaining	  (and	  re-­‐explaining)	  political	  change	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring:	  trajectories	  of	  democratization	  and	  of	  authoritarianism	  in	  the	  Maghreb,’	  
Democratization.	  20,	  6,	  2013,	  p.	  969-­‐990	  39	  Mona	  Ghobashy,	   ‘The	  Praxis	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  Revolution,’	  Middle	  East	  Report,	  No	  258,	   Spring,	  2011,	  www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-­‐egyptian-­‐revolution	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Being	  better	  situated	  to	  make	  political	  concessions,	  the	  King	  responded	  with	  less	  repression	   and	   a	   more	   credible	   power	   sharing	   initiative	   that	   allowed	   him	   to	  divide	  his	   opponents	  while	   stopping	  well	   short	   of	   democratization.	   Protests	   of	  100,000	   youth	   activists	  were	   contained	   by	   the	   royalist	   loyalty	   of	   the	   illiterate	  rural	   masses	   and	   the	   newly	   co-­‐opted	   established	   parties,	   an	   outcome	   very	  different	  from	  that	  in	  the	  republics.40	  	  
Between	  Democratisation	  and	  Authoritarian	  Persistence	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  overthrow	  incumbent	  presidents	  and	  quite	  another	  to	  make	  the	  transition	   to	   democracy.	   However,	   Morocco,	   Egypt	   and	   Tunisia	   have	   relative	  advantages	   in	   making	   a	   transition	   compared	   to	   other	   Arab	   states.	   Unlike	   the	  Mashreq	  states,	  ethnic	  and	  sectarian	  cleavages	  are	  not	  insurmountable	  obstacles	  since	  the	  three	  NA	  states	  enjoy	  relative	  homogeneity,	  long	  histories	  of	  statehood	  and	  relative	  incorporation	  of	  minorities,	  whether	  Berbers	  in	  Morocco	  or	  Copts	  in	  Egypt.	   Governing	   largely	   de-­‐tribalised	   societies	   and	   without	   huge	   amounts	   of	  rent,	  they	  cannot	  clientalise	  and	  co-­‐opt	  tribal	  society	  to	  marginalise	  participatory	  pressures	  in	  the	  way	  possible	  in	  the	  GCC	  regimes.	  Tunisia	  in	  particular,	  with	  its	  larger	   middle	   class,	   mass	   literacy,	   secular	   tradition	   and	   moderate	   Islamist	  movement	   was	   widely	   seen	   as	   having	   the	   best	   prospects	   for	   democratic	  consolidation.	   In	  all	   three	  states,	   Islamist	  movements,	  with	   large	  constituencies	  embraced	  the	  democratic	  political	  process	  and	  were	  the	  initial	  winners	  in	  post-­‐Uprising	  elections.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  enduring	  power	  of	  the	  ‘deep	  state’	  and	   the	   enduring	   intractability	   of	   inherited	   problems	   meant	   the	   extent	   of	  democratic	  change	  remained	  constrained.41	  	   In	  Morocco,	  democratization	  depended	  on	  whether	   the	  king	  was	  willing	  to	  concede	  enough	  real	  power-­‐sharing	  to	  increase	  incorporative	  capacity.	  He	  did	  concede	  constitutional	  changes	  requiring	   that	  he	  appoint	   the	  government	   from	  the	   party	   that	   achieved	   a	   plurality	   in	   elections;	   yet	   he	   could	   still	   dismiss	   the	  prime	  minister,	  dissolve	  parliament	  and	  he	  also	  retained	  control	  over	  the	  armed	  forces,	  security	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  This	  limited	  change	  was	  enough	  to	  revitalise	  political	   parties	   that	   had	   been	   marginalised	   by	   neoliberal	   technocrats.42	  The	  moderate	   Islamist	   JDP	   won	   a	   plurality	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   promises	   to	   attack	   the	  corrupt	   crony	   capitalism	   around	   the	   makhzen	   and	   formed	   a	   coalition	  government	  with	  the	  Istiqlal	  party	  and	  two	  smaller	  parties,	  around	  a	  platform	  of	  a	  ‘third	  way	  between	  revolution	  and	  authoritarianism.’	  However,	  once	  the	  threat	  of	   the	   Uprising	   passed,	   especially	   as	   secular-­‐Islamist	   tensions	   split	   the	   youth	  movement,	  the	  king	  moved	  to	  block	  the	  PJD’s	  investigations	  into	  his	  cronies.	  His	  constitutional	   concessions	   were	   yet	   another	   variant	   on	   the	  monarchy’s	   tested	  techniques	  of	  diffusing	  and	  absorbing	  popular	  discontent	   rather	   than	  a	  serious	  movement	   toward	   a	   constitutional	   democracy.	   It	   worked	   because	   of	   the	  monarchy’s	  continued	  prestige	  among	  what	  is	  the	  most	  illiterate	  and	  patriarchal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Irene	  Fernández	  Molina,	  ‘The	  Monarchy	  vs.	  the	  20	  February	  Movement:	  Who	  Holds	  the	  Reins	  of	  Political	  Change	  in	  Morocco?’	  Mediterranean	  Politics,	  Volume	  16,	  Issue	  3,	  2011.	  41	  George	  Joffé,	  	  ‘The	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  North	  Africa:	  origins	  and	  prospects,’	  The	  Journal	  of	  North	  
African	  Studies,	  16:4,	  2011;	  Jeffrey	  Haynes,	  ‘Arab	  Uprising’,	  Islamists	  and	  Democratization,	  
Mediterranean	  Politics,	  18:2,	  2013,	  pages	  170-­‐188.	  	  	  42 	  Atul	   Razdan,	   ‘Arab	   Awakening:	   Morocco’s	   Genteel	   Arab	   Spring,’	   Diplomatist,	   2012,	  http://www.diplomatist.com/dipo10th2012/story_017.htm	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of	  North	  African	   societies.43	  In	  Morocco,	   the	  monarch	   continued	   to	  possess	   the	  hegemony	  to	  define	  and	  manipulate	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game.	  	  	   By	   contrast,	   in	   the	   republics,	   the	   removal	   of	   entrenched	   presidential	  monarchies	   exposed	   sharper	   and	   less	   manageable	   societal	   divisions.	   First,	   a	  three-­‐way	  division	  opened	  up	  between	  state	  establishments,	  secular	  opposition,	  and	   Islamic	   forces.	   The	   main	   initial	   outcome	   of	   regime	   collapse	   in	   Egypt	   and	  Tunisia	  was	  the	  empowerment	  of	  Islamists,	  alarming	  secularists	  and	  liberals;	  the	  Islamist	   victories	   in	   the	   first	  post-­‐democracy	  elections	  were,	  however,	  partly	   a	  result	  of	   the	  dissolution	  of	  ruling	  parties	  and	  the	  disorganisation	  of	   the	  secular	  opposition	  and	  revolutionary	  youth;	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  presidential	  election	  in	  which	  the	   old	   regime	   candidate	   was	   barely	   edged	   by	   his	   Islamist	   rival,	   Muhammad	  Morsi,	  better	   reflected	   the	  actual	  distribution	  of	   social	  power.	  But	   this	  was	  not	  reflected	  inside	  political	  institutions	  dominated	  by	  Islamists;	  and	  the	  MB,	  finding	  that	   winning	   an	   electoral	   mandate	   did	   not	   give	   real	   authority	   over	   the	  bureaucratic	   ‘deep	   state’	   was	   unwilling	   to	   more	   widely	   share	   power.	   This	  precipitated	  an	  alignment	  of	  the	  secularists	  and	  youth	  with	  the	  remnants	  (falool)	  of	   the	   old	   regime	   to	   subsequently	   shift	   the	   power	   balance	   away	   from	   the	  Islamists.	  Second,	   in	   these	   struggles,	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game,	   notably	   constitutional	  provisions	   regulating	   political	   competition	   became	   themselves	   the	   objects	   of	  contestation.	   Particularly	   in	   Egypt,	   adherence	   to	   democratic	   rules	   by	   all	   three	  camps	  was	  contingent	  on	   the	  effect	  on	   their	  power	  positions.	  Unelected	  bodies	  such	  as	   the	  military	  and	   judiciary	  acted	   in	  a	  highly	  partisan	  way	  while	   Islamist	  dominated	   assemblies	   pushed	   through	   provisions	   alienating	   secularists.	   Both	  Islamists	  and	  liberals	  competed	  to	  get	  the	  military	  on	  their	  side	  against	  the	  other,	  with	  the	  MB	  striking	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  deal	   that	   left	   the	  military	  autonomous	  of	  civilian	  oversight	  and	  entrenched	  as	  a	  powerful	  economic	  actor.	  	  	   In	   the	  absence	  of	   institutionalized	   rules	  of	   the	  game,	  praetorianism	  was	  unleashed,	  again	  particularly	   in	  Egypt,	  with	  the	  struggle	  for	  power	  taking	  place	  not	   just	   through	   elections	   but	   also	   via	   street	   protest	   and	   violence,	   strikes,	  repression,	   and	   intrigue	   to	   win	   over	   the	   military	   and	   external	   funders.	   The	  weakened	  state	  was	  less	  capable	  of	  restoring	  order	  at	  a	  time	  when	  mobilisation	  exceeded	  institutionalisation	  but	  in	  Egypt	  the	  split	  between	  secular	  and	  Islamist	  civil/political	  society	  restored	  a	  certain	  capacity	  for	  the	  army-­‐led	  ‘deep	  state’	  to	  balance	  between	  them	  and	  position	  itself	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  order	  appealing	  to	  a	  population	  tired	  of	  constant	  turmoil	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  makhzen	  in	  Morocco.	  	  	   However,	   despite	   somewhat	   similar	   Islamist-­‐secular	   splits,	   the	  trajectories	   of	   the	   two	   republics	   also	   diverged,	   reflective	   of	   their	   earlier	   state	  formation	   differences.	   In	   Egypt,	   deepened	   praetorianism	   sharply	   reversed	  democratisation.	  The	  convergence	  of	  mass	  street	  protests	  with	  the	  military	  coup	  of	  30	  June	  2013	  to	  depose	  the	  elected	  president	  restored	  the	  power	  of	  the	  deep	  state:	   in	  deposing	   the	  elected	   Islamist	  president,	  using	  violence	  against	  Morsi’s	  supporters	  and	  outlawing	  the	  MB	  as	  a	  terrorist	  organization,	  the	  military	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43 	  Maati	   Monjib,	   ‘All	   the	   King’s	   Islamists,’	   Sada,	   September	   20,	   2012	  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20/all-­‐king-­‐s-­‐islamists/e289;	   Muhammed	   Jalid,	   ‘The	  Rise	   of	   Populists	   in	   Moroccan	   Politics,’	   Sada,	   November	   29,	   2012,	  http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/11/29/rise-­‐of-­‐populists-­‐in-­‐moroccan-­‐politics/eo0c	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deep	  state,	  with	   the	  complicity	  of	   secularists	  and	  revolutionary	  youth,	   in	  effect	  made	  a	  transition	  to	  democracy	  impossible.	  No	  democracy	  that	  excludes	  one	  of	  the	  most	   important	   socio-­‐political	   forces	   in	   Egypt	   can	   be	   consolidated.	   Only	   a	  regime	  retaining	  extra-­‐constitutional	  powers	  for	  the	  security	  forces	  can	  possibly	  marginalise	  the	  Islamists	  and	  cope	  with	  the	  violent	  spill-­‐over	  of	  their	  resistance	  to	   repression.	   The	   result	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   hybrid	   regime,	   Bonapartist,	   but	  with	  pluralistic	  appendages	  and	  restoring	  the	  army	  to	  the	  central	  role	   it	  assumed	  in	  Egypt’s	  state-­‐building	  after	  the	  1952	  revolution.	  	   In	   Tunisia,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   a	   precarious	   democratic	   transition	  remained	   on	   track,	   despite	   problems	   similar	   to	   Egypt’s.	   The	   Islamist	  Al-­‐Nahda	  won	   a	   plurality	   in	   the	   first	   post-­‐Uprising	   elections,	   owing	   to	   its	   unique	   name	  recognition,	   lack	   of	   complicity	   in	   the	   Ben	   Ali	   regime,	   grassroots	   organising	  capacity,	  higher	  penetration	  of	   rural	  areas	  compared	   to	  city-­‐centric	  secularists,	  and	   a	  moderate	   Islamic	  message	   attuned	   to	  Tunisia’s	   political	   culture.44	  Unlike	  the	  Egyptian	  Ikhwan,	  however,	  Al-­‐Nahda	  shared	  power	  with	  two	  secular	  parties,	  and	   a	   secularist	   politician	   became	   president	   alongside	   an	   Islamist	   prime	  minister.	  To	  be	  sure,	  once	  in	  power	  the	  Nahda	  party	  sought	  to	  ban	  members	  of	  the	   two-­‐million	   member	   former	   ruling	   Constitutional	   Democratic	   Rally	   (RCD)	  from	  participating	  in	  politics,	  a	  move	  that	  would	  weaken	  secularists	  and	  liberals	  some	   of	   whom	   were	   associated	   with	   the	   old	   regime	   at	   various	   points	   and	  prevent	   them	   joining	   in	   a	   counter-­‐coalition	   which,	   polls	   showed,	   could	   have	  mounted	   a	  major	   challenge	   to	   Al-­‐Nahda.	   Former	   regime	   party	  members	   were	  behind	   growing	   protests	   against	   the	   government;	   the	   trade	   union	   movement	  called	   a	   general	   strike	   and	   faced	   attack	   by	   the	   Islamist	  militia,	   the	   League	   for	  Protection	   of	   the	   Revolution.	   Militant	   Salafists’	   attempts	   to	   restrict	   cultural	  expression	   they	   considered	   anti-­‐Islamic	   seemed	   tolerated	   by	   the	   government.	  The	  acrimonious	  discourse	  and	  the	  murders	  of	  secular	  political	  leaders	  critical	  of	  the	  Al-­‐Nahda	  government	  plunged	  the	  country	  into	  crisis	  in	  2013	  similar	  to	  what	  was,	   in	   parallel,	   happening	   in	   Egypt.	   The	   main	   difference	   was	   that	   the	  unpoliticised	   Tunisian	   military	   lacked	   the	   ambition	   to	   use	   the	   crisis	   to	   assert	  dominance;	   indeed,	   because	   there	   was	   no	   ‘man	   on	   horseback’	   in	   the	   small	  politically	   unambitious	   military	   that	   rival	   political	   forces	   could	   call	   upon	   to	  ‘rescue’	  the	  country	  from	  the	  other,	  they	  needed	  to	  compromise	  their	  differences	  through	   dialogue. 45 	  In	   brokering	   a	   compromise,	   the	   powerful	   trade	   union	  federation	   played	   a	   role	   similar	   to	   the	   monarchy	   and	   army	   as	   arbiter;	   this	  reflected	  its	  historically	  pivotal	  role	  going	  back	  to	  the	  independence	  struggle.46	  	   Whatever	   the	   variations	   in	   political	   practices	   among	   the	   three	   states,	   a	  deeper	   obstacle	   to	   democratic	   consolidation	   in	   all	   of	   them	   is	   that	   democratic	  procedures	  by	  themselves	  are	  unlikely	  to	  deliver	  solutions	  to	  problems	  rooted	  in	  a	   political	   economy	   where	   globalised	   neoliberalism	   dominates.	   This	   is	  particularly	   likely	   to	   disillusion	   those	  who	   backed	   political	   change	   in	   order	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Erik	  Churchill,	  ‘Tunisia’s	  Electoral	  Lesson:	  the	  Importance	  of	  Campaign	  Strategy,’	  Sada,	  October	  27,	  2012,	  http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=	  45	  For	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  Tunisia’s	  prospects,	  see	  Emma	  Murphy,	  ‘The	  Tunisian	  uprising	  and	  the	  precarious	  path	  to	  democracy,’	  Mediterranean	  Politics,	  16:2,	  2011,	  299-­‐305.	  46	  Mohamed-­‐Salah	  Omri,	  ‘Trade	  unions	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  specifically	  Tunisian	  protest	  configuration,’	  24	  September	  2013,	  OpenDemocracy,	  http://www.opendemocracy.net/mohamed-­‐salah-­‐omri/trade-­‐unions-­‐and-­‐construction-­‐of-­‐specifically-­‐tunisian-­‐protest-­‐configuration 
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redress	   the	   wealth	   mal-­‐distribution	   under	   neoliberal	   crony	   capitalism.	  Revolution	  has	  so	  far	  remained	  purely	  political,	  with	  no	  attempts	  to	  attack	  unjust	  economic	  inequalities;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  actually	  worsened	  economic	  growth,	  hence	   prospects	   for	   addressing	   unemployment,	   by	   deterring	   investors	   and	  tourism.	  What	  has	  changed	  for	  the	  unemployed	  is	  increased	  political	  freedom	  to	  express	   their	   frustrations.	  Nor	  are	  elected	  governments	  necessarily	  better	  able	  to	   manage	   deep-­‐rooted	   economic	   crises:	   while	   they	   might	   enjoy	   greater	  legitimacy	  to	  take	  hard	  economic	  decisions—although	  there	   is	  so	  far	  no	  sign	  of	  this-­‐-­‐they	  will	  also	  be	  caught	  between	  the	  need	  to	  favour	  investors	  and	  to	  deliver	  material	   benefits	   to	   voting	   constituents;	   hence	   they	   may	   prove	   less	   able	   to	  manage	  the	  economy	  than	  the	  old	  regimes.	  Nor	  will	  elected	  governments,	  facing	  the	   deep	   state,	   be	   likely	   to	   promote	   thorough	   reform	   of	   past	   abuses;	   thus,	   in	  Morocco	   limited	   democratisation	  was	   not	   enough	   to	   break	   down	   the	   regime’s	  unwillingness	   to	   countenance	   attacks	   on	   crony	   capitalism	   and	   in	   post-­‐Morsi	  Egypt	   Mubarak’s	   crony	   capitalists	   were	   rehabilitated.	   Moreover,	   the	  fragmentation	   of	   political	   parties,	   with	   often	   indistinguishable	   socio-­‐economic	  programs,	  will	  make	  governance	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  voters	  to	  hold	  governments	  to	   account	   difficult,	   especially	   as	   many	   of	   the	   big	   issues,	   notably	   wealth	  distribution,	   will	   remain	   excluded	   from	   the	   political	   agenda	   by	   neo-­‐liberal	  measures	  pushed	  by	  IFIs	  on	  vulnerable	  economies;	  as	  in	  the	  West,	  all	  parties	  will	  follow	   similar	   economic	   policies,	   hollowing	   out	   democracy	   and	   discouraging	  participation.	  	  Elections	  will	  therefore	  likely	  turn	  on	  cultural	  and	  identity	  issues	  framed	  in	  de-­‐stabilising	  zero-­‐sum	  terms.	  	  	   	  Finally,	   irreversible	   dependence	   on	   the	   West	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   a	  legitimacy	   liability	   in	   MENA	   as	   many	   of	   the	   grievances	   that	   motivated	   the	  uprising	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Western	  pressures	  for	  neo-­‐liberalism	  and	  policies	  toward	   the	   region.	   If	   elected	   governments	   are	   unable	   to	   assert	   any	   more	  independence	   than	   their	   authoritarian	   predecessors,	   the	   new	   regimes	   will	   be	  deprived	   of	   one	   key-­‐ingredient	   crucial	   to	   democratic	   consolidation	   elsewhere,	  nationalist	  legitimacy.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	   North	   African	   experience	   allows	   us	   to	   assess	   the	   agent-­‐structure	   debate	  regarding	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  path	  dependency	  closes	  off	  possibilities	  for	  agency.	  First,	   it	   suggests	   that	   the	   deep	   political	   economy	   infrastructure	   shapes	  developments	  at	  the	  institutional	  and	  leadership	  level.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  age	  of	  statist	  modernisation	   (coterminous	   with	   bi-­‐polarity	   and	   Keysian	   mixed	   economies	  globally),	   populist	   authoritarianism	   dominated	   the	   region.	   In	   the	   republics,	  charismatic	   ideological	   leadership	   governed	   through	   single-­‐party	   institutions	  and	   corporatism	   led	   by	   the	   ‘new	   middle	   class’	   and	   including	   peasants	   and	  workers.	  In	  this	  period,	  traditional	  monarchy,	  eschewing	  state-­‐led	  development,	  was	   on	   the	   defensive.	   Later,	   rent	   from	   the	   1970s	   oil	   boom	   drove	   parallel	  institutional	  expansion	  and	  clientelism,	  with	  charismatic	  authority	  routinised	  in	  neo-­‐patrimonial	   institutions;	   conversely,	   the	   oil	   bust	   opened	   the	   door	   to	  neoliberalism.	   The	   movement	   toward	   US	   hegemony	   and	   neo-­‐globalisation,	  driving	   neoliberalism	   at	   the	   regional	   level,	   was	   reflected	   in	   a	   post-­‐populist	  authoritarian	   reconfiguration	   of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   giving	   privileged	   access	  to	   new	   bourgeoisies	   and	   excluding	   populist	   constituencies.	   Neo-­‐liberalism	  uniformly	   fostered	   crony	   capitalism	   regardless	   of	   regime	   type,	   pushing	   a	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convergence	   toward	  deepened	  patrimonialization	  of	   leadership	   in	   all	   three	  NA	  states.	  	  	  	   Yet	   persisting	   variations	   in	   state	   formation	   paths	   help	   explain	   the	  variations	  in	  continuity	  and	  change	  accompanying	  the	  Arab	  Uprising	  in	  the	  three	  states.	   The	   much	   lesser	   extent	   of	   change	   in	   royal	   Morocco	   as	   compared	   to	  republican	   Tunisia	   and	   Egypt	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   several	   factors.	   First,	   as	  modernisation	   theory	   argued,	   the	   increased	   social	   mobilisation	   accompanying	  modernisation	  must	  be	  matched	  by	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  political	   incorporation	   if	   regimes	   are	   not	   to	   face	   destabilisation.	   As	   regards	  economic	   development,	   the	   very	   virtues	   of	   the	  modernising	   republics,	   notably	  greater	   investment	   in	   education,	   exacerbated	   their	   crisis	   of	   job	   creation.	   As	  regards	  political	  incorporation,	  the	  Moroccan	  monarchy	  incrementally	  increased	  its	  techniques	  of	  co-­‐optation	  to	  match	  delayed	  social	  mobilisation;	  the	  Tunisian	  and	   Egyptian	   regimes	   did	   the	   opposite,	   propelling	  modernisation	   at	   a	   greater	  rate	  than	  political	  incorporation.	  Additionally,	  where	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  leadership	  dominates,	   traditional	   monarchs	   are	   more	   ‘naturally’	   legitimate:	   while	  presidents’	  legitimacy	  depended	  on	  nationalist	  or	  socio-­‐economic	  achievements,	  which	   they	   did	   not	   sufficiently	   deliver,	   the	   traditional	   legitimacy	   of	  Morocco’s	  monarchy	   was	   impervious	   to	   its	   socio-­‐economic	   under-­‐performance.	   Finally,	  while	  the	  monarchy	  exploited	  inherited	  secular-­‐Islamic	  divisions,	  the	  republics’	  attempts	   to	   marginalise	   Islam	   only	   generated	   a	   permanent	   opposition-­‐in-­‐waiting.	  	  	   Such	  persisting	  structural	  differences	  made	  for	  key	  differences	  in	  agency:	  the	   lesser	  mobilisation	   and	  more	  moderate	   demands	   of	   protestors	   in	  Morocco	  reflected	  the	  divided,	  co-­‐opted	  political	  arena	  structured	  by	  the	  monarchy	  over	  decades;	  while	  the	  more	  thorough	  and	  radical	  mobilisations	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  reflected	  the	  imbalance	  between	  social	  mobilisation	  and	  political	  inclusion.	  This	  variation	  in	  agency—mass	  mobilisation-­‐-­‐profoundly	  mattered	  for	  the	  differences	  between	  regime	  survival	   in	  Morocco	  and	  removal	   in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia;	  so	  also	  did	   the	   choices	   of	   the	   military	   commanders	   not	   to	   defend	   presidents	   in	   the	  republics,	  a	  function	  of	  the	  greater	  de-­‐legitimation	  of	  presidential	  monarchs.	  The	  agency	  of	  democratic	  movements	  to	  go	  beyond	  regime	  leadership	  change	  toward	  democratic	   transition	   also	   varied	   according	   to	   inherited	   structure;	   thus,	  democratisation	  made	  more	  headway	  in	  Tunisia	  because	  it	  was	  more	  compatible	  with	  this	  structure,	  such	  as	  the	  historic	  centrality	  of	  trade	  union	  power,	  and	  less	  so	  in	  Egypt	  where	  it	  was	  obstructed	  by	  the	  military-­‐dominated	  deep	  state;	  and	  in	  Morocco	  where	  the	  monarch’s	  semi-­‐pluralistic	  practices	  substituted	  for	  it.	  	  	   This	   points	   to	   how	   state	   formation	   trajectories	   generated	   enduring	  structures	  that	  make	  it	  likely	  the	  coming	  years	  will	  bring	  as	  much	  authoritarian	  continuity	  as	  democratic	   change.	  First,	   especially	   in	   the	   republics,	   the	  Uprising	  unleashed	   levels	  of	  political	  mobilisation	  that	  could	  not	  readily	  be	  absorbed	  by	  institutions;	   the	   lack	   of	   consensus	   on	   rules	   of	   the	   game,	   particularly	   regarding	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  army	  and	  religion	  in	  politics,	  set	  back	  moves	  toward	  democratic	  consolidation.	   Second,	   the	   Uprising	   exposed	   the	   enduring	   secular-­‐Islamic	  cleavage	   that	   undermined	   the	   shared	   identity	   needed	   for	   democratisation.	   In	  Egypt	   the	   army	   and	   in	   Morocco	   the	   king	   exploited	   public	   weariness	   with	  disorder	  and	  cultural	  cleavages	  to	  limit	  democratisation.	  	  	   Political	   economy	   analysis	   identifies	   a	   further	   obstacle	   to	  democratisation.	  The	  Uprisings	  were	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  period	  of	  neoliberal	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globalisation	   in	   the	   region,	   which	   created	   both	   acute	   social	   inequalities	   and	  enduring	   dependencies	   on	   the	  Western-­‐centred	   international	   financial	   system.	  However,	   the	   latter	   locks	   Middle	   East	   states	   into	   neoliberal	   practices	   and	  removes	   the	   big	   issues	   of	   politics—distribution	   of	   wealth—from	   domestic	  political	  agendas;	  doses	  of	  authoritarian	  power,	  as	  well	  as	  divide	  and	  rule,	  will	  likely	   be	   needed	   to	   turn	   back	   demands	   for	   social	   justice	   that	   cannot	   be	  accommodated	  in	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  order.	  	  	   As	  inherited	  structure	  closes	  in	  on	  the	  agency	  unleashed	  by	  the	  Uprisings,	  the	  most	  likely	  outcome	  in	  all	  three	  states	  is	  hybrid	  regimes,	  with	  varying	  mixes	  of	   the	   authoritarian	   features	   of	   their	   earlier	   state	   formation	   with	   the	   mass	  mobilising	  effects	  of	  the	  Uprising.	  Now	  politicians	  must	  use	  and	  manipulate	  the	  more	  mobilised	  masses	   in	   their	   rivalries,	  but	   they	  must	  also	   share	  power	  with	  the	   ‘deep	   state’	   and	   are	   constrained	   by	   external	   dependencies.	   While	   such	  hybridity	  appears	  to	  have	  greater	  legitimacy	  in	  a	  monarchy	  because	  of	  its	  ability	  to	   stand	   ‘above’	   politics,	   in	   all	   three	   states	   it	   is	   congruent	   with	   current	  circumstances.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  1:	  Political	  Economy	  Measures,	  NA	  States	  Per	  capita	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  $PPP	  (2005)	  	  	  	  	  HDI	  (2003)	  	  	  Literacy	  (2003)	  Egypt	   5049	   65.9	   55.6	  Morocco	   3547	   63.1	   50.7	  Tunisia	   6461	  	   73.3	   74.3	  
Source:	  Sami	  Bibi	  and	  Mustafa	  K.	  Nabli,	  Equity	  and	  
Inequality	  in	  the	  Arab	  Region,	  Policy	  Research	  Report	  no	  33	  (Dokki,	  Giza:	  Economic	  Research	  Forum,	  2010),	  pp.	  8,	  49	  	  
